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Stories of obstetricians being forced to stop delivering babies because of
skyrocketing malpractice premiums brought national attention to the
malpractice crisis.1 The medical profession has convinced many Americans
that tort reform 2 is needed to stabilize malpractice premiums. Now, the
medical profession is turning its attention to improper testimony given by
physician experts in medical malpractice suits. Physicians have long
1. See generally William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 10, 12-13 (detailing earlier malpractice crises).
2. Common examples of tort reform include damage caps and shortening statutes of limitations.
Id. at 10. A discussion of tort reform is beyond the scope of this Article.
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suspected expert witness testimony was available for sale.3 Only recently,
however, has organized medicine begun to consider whether the medical
profession may keep "hired guns" out of the courtroom. 4  This Article
explains that, because of this trend, state medical boards are the proper
authority to police improper testimony given by physician experts in medical
malpractice actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the North Carolina Medical Board disciplined Dr. Gary
Lustgarten for giving improper expert testimony for a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice suit.5  The Board, finding Dr. Lustgarten gave "'disparaging,
demeaning, or impertinent responses ... and 'totally unsubstantiated,
inflammatory' testimony," became the first state medical board to revoke a
medical license for improper expert witness testimony.6 Dr. Lustgarten
appealed the board's action, and in 2003, a court stayed the license
revocation.7 Both parties are appealing the decision to a North Carolina
appellate court.8
This Article demonstrates that medical boards may properly discipline
physicians who provide improper testimony in medical malpractice suits.
Improper testimony, for the purposes of this Article, is defined as testimony
not based on generally accepted theories about medical science. 9 Part II
3. See M. Lawrence Podolsky, Which Truth Are These Hired Guns Telling?, PRIVATE
PRACTICE, July 1991, at 45. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert
Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253
(2001) (explaining that since experts are not held accountable in tort or contract law for their
testimony, they are thus motivated to deliver the testimony expected by the market).
4. See, e.g., Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies' Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert
Testimony, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 549, 551-52 (2004).
5. Stephanie Mencimer, The White Wall: A New Code of Conduct is Taking Hold of the Medical
Profession: First Do No Harm-To Your Colleagues, 65 LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story-mencimer-marpar04.html.
6. Id. This is particularly troubling because Dr. Lustgarten was punished solely for opinion
testimony. See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED.
185, 188-89 (2004). There were no explicit allegations that he testified falsely; nor were there any
ascertainable facts by which to measure his testimony. See id. at 204 (noting that Lustgarten was
punished for stating his expert medical opinion on the proper standard of care under the
circumstances).
7. Cohen, supra note 6, at 204.
8. Maureen Gladman, Scared Silent: The Clash Between Malpractice Lawsuits and Expert
Testimony, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, July-Aug. 2003, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mO843/is_4_29/ai_105542617.
9. An example of improper testimony based on this definition can be found in Austin v. Am.
Ass 'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001). Dr. Austin was suspended from the
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explains that the medical profession is justified in attempting to regulate
improper expert witness testimony. 10 Part III briefly reviews other methods
of regulating improper expert witness testimony and concludes that
discipline by state medical boards is the most effective way to prevent
improper testimony. " Part IV examines the mechanisms medical boards
currently have in place to regulate expert witness testimony.' 2 It explains
that boards may consider the giving of improper testimony to be either
negligent practice of medicine or an ethical violation. 13  It continues by
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches, and finally
proposes that medical boards promulgate standards of practice for giving
expert witness testimony. 14  Finally, Part V considers implications of
allowing medical boards to regulate medical expert testimony. 15
II. THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING TO REGULATE
PHYSICIAN EXPERT TESTIMONY THROUGH DISCIPLINARY ACTION
The medical profession is self-regulating, 16 so it is obligated to protect
the public from incompetent and dishonest physicians."' The public is
harmed by doctors who provide improper expert testimony because
increasing medical malpractice premiums negatively affect access to
healthcare services. 18  Thus, because a presumed link exists between
improper expert witness testimony and increasing malpractice premiums, the
profession should be obligated to police expert witness testimony. 19
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) for giving improper testimony as a
plaintiff's expert. Id. at 968. The court's opinion seems to indicate that Dr. Austin's testimony had
no basis in scientific fact. Id. at 970-71. Dr. Austin testified that "the majority of neurosurgeons"
would agree with his opinion when, in fact, he had not discussed the matter with other physicians.
Id. at 970. Moreover, Dr. Austin claimed that two scholarly articles supported his position when, in
fact, they did not. Id. The above example is admittedly a vague definition of improper testimony: it
would include testimony advocating a minority opinion if the expert made it seem as if the minority
opinion was the generally accepted practice.
10. See discussion infra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra notes 47-120 and accompanying text.
12. See discussion infra notes 121-234 and accompanying text.
13. See discussion infra notes 121-229 and accompanying text.
14. See discussion infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
15. See discussion infra notes 235-55 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the
Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REv. 1327, 1328 (1991) (noting
that "professions self-regulate through the adoption of ethical standards."). See generally 1 BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-1 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the history of regulation and
licensure of healthcare professionals).
17. See Constantinides, supra note 16, at 1340.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.
19. Id.
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A. The Medical Profession Is Self-Regulating and Therefore Determines
Which Activities To Regulate
Despite a "chipping away" at the traditional deference given
professions, 20 the medical profession is still allowed to regulate itself. First,
although a license2' is required to practice medicine, 2 states delegate
authority to promulgate standards of practice and sanction physicians2 3 to
medical licensing boards, whose members are mostly physicians. 24 Second,
the profession controls the primary prerequisite for state licensure by
accrediting medical schools. 25 Third (and most importantly), the medical
profession establishes the standard of care in medical malpractice suits. 26 In
return, the profession should protect the public from incompetent and
dishonest physicians. Therefore, self-regulation benefits the public as well
as the profession.
The public benefits from self-regulation in several ways.27 The primary
justification for professional self-regulation is that it removes the burden of
20. Michael J. Polelle, Who's on First, and What's a Professional? 33 U.S.F.L. REv., 205, 230
(1999).
21. Licensure schemes are generally classified into two types: revenue-raising and regulatory.
Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to
the Ex-Felon 's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REv. 187, 189 1995). Medical licensure is a
regulatory licensure scheme because it is intended to safeguard the public's interest instead of to
raise money for the state. See id. at 189-90 (explaining that the purpose of revenue-raising licenses
is to increase the state's revenue, while the purpose of regulatory licenses is to regulate activities to
protect the public interest).
22. See generally I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-8. It is generally illegal for non-licensed
persons to practice medicine. Randall G. Holcombe, Eliminating Scope of Practice and Licensing
Laws to Improve Health Care, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 236 (2003).
23. 1 FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-1.
24. The California medical board has twenty-one members, of which twelve must be physicians.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2001, 2007 (2004). Under the Illinois Medical Practice Act, five of the
disciplinary board's nine members must be physicians. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/7(A) (2004 &
Supp. 2005). In Texas, the medical board has nineteen members, nine of which must be medical
doctors and three of which must be doctors of osteopathy. TEX. Occ. CODE § 152.002 (Vernon
2004).
25. 1 FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-2.
26. Id. at § 6-2. But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982-83 (Wash. 1974) (finding that
compliance with medical custom was not a valid defense in a medical malpractice suit).
27. Critics contend that professions are self-serving monopolies who use their influence to
prevent competition. See, e.g., Polelle, supra note 20, at 224-26. Arguably, licensure statutes were
designed as barriers to entry to prevent competition. See Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d
233 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (finding that stringent medical regulations were purely self-serving). See
generally Tanya J. Dobash, Note, Physician-Patient Sexual Contact: The Battle Between the State
and the Medical Profession, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1725, 1738 (1993) (explaining that the
medical profession asked states to help it regulate the practice of medicine by requiring licensure).
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regulating the profession from the judicial and administrative systems.
Another justification is based on the economic theory of "market failure."
According to this theory, the profession must ensure compliance with
minimum standards of practice because consumers cannot adequately
evaluate the quality of medical care.2 9 Most importantly, self-regulation
promotes a professional "sense of ethical obligation."' a  Because
professional regulation both privileges and burdens the profession, it is
basically a "social contract" between the profession and the public."'
Because of this social contract, courts and state legislatures must permit
the profession to determine standards for the provision of expert witness
testimony. In turn, the profession must protect society from self-interested
expert witnesses. 32
B. The Public Is Harmed by Skyrocketing Medical Malpractice Premiums
In 2003, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that medical
malpractice premiums for select specialties had increased dramatically since
1999,33 which reduced access to healthcare services.3 4  Physicians were
reluctant to perform high risk procedures. As a consequence of these
factors, some left the profession.35  Rural areas have been most affected.
3 6
For example, maternity units in two rural West Virginia counties recently
closed because the obstetricians could not afford the premium increases.
37
Therefore, the negative effects of the current malpractice crisis are felt not
28. See Polelle, supra note 20, at 226.
29. 1 FuRow, supra note 16, at § 3-1. But this does not mean that patients have no
responsibility to protect themselves: a consumer should make an informed decision in choosing a
physician. Heyward H. Bouknight, III, Note, Between the Scalpel and the Lie: Comparing Theories
of Physician Accountability for Misrepresentations of Experience and Competence, 60 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2003).
30. See Polelle, supra note 20, at 230.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 229.
33. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf.
34. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03836high.pdf [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS].
35. Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and the Impact of State
Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.20vl/DC 1.
36. See Diane Cook, Beware the Hidden Consequences of the Malpractice Crisis, MANAGED
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only by physicians. The public is also harmed by reduced access to
healthcare services.
C. Improper Expert Testimony Is Connected to Increasing Malpractice
Premiums
A presumed causal link exists between improper expert witness
testimony and increasing medical malpractice premiums. First, a
documented connection between increases in claims payouts and
malpractice premium increases exists.38 Second, there appears to be reliable
evidence that Americans have become more litigious and juries are now
more generous to plaintiffs.39 Filed medical malpractice claims 40 increased
by more than 10% per year from 1975 to 1986, 41 and the average award
tripled between 1994 and 2000.42 Third, the Harvard Medical Practice
Study III revealed a "gap" between potential and actual malpractice claims;
most people injured by medical malpractice never file suit and most filed
claims had no evident basis.43 In light of this, it is reasonable to assume that
malpractice cases based on theories of medicine or causation (not built on
medical science) 44 are brought and successfully litigated.
The plaintiffs in these "frivolous" suits must generally present expert
testimony establishing standard of care and breach,45 so it is reasonable to
38. IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS, supra note 34. But see Sage, supra note 1, at 10
(arguing that malpractice crisis is actually an insurance crisis). Whether rising premiums truly affect
health care access is uncertain and is beyond the scope of this Article.
39. See generally IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS, supra note 34. Whether this is a result of
unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys who bring frivolous medical malpractice actions and judges and
juries who are swayed by "junk science" is beyond the scope of this Article.
40. The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must: (1) establish the appropriate standard of
care, (2) prove the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) show a causal relationship
between the breach and the plaintiff's injury. See I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 6-2.
41. Steven K. Berenson, Is it Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 659 (2001).
The American Medical Association estimates that between 1982 and 1984, malpractice premiums
increased 44%, twice the rate of increase in health care costs. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining
Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699,
714 (2002).
42. Jennifer E. Shannon & David Boxold, Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements and
Statistical Analysis, JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, at 1 (2002).
43. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I1, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245-51
(1991).
44. This Article will not go so far as to claim that these cases are frivolous. There may indeed be
a genuine injury to the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff does not have a legal claim.
45. See generally I FuRRow, supra note 16, at § 6-2 (explaining that standard of care and breach
are normally established through expert testimony).
assume that these cases are consequently supported by improper expert
46
witness testimony. Accordingly, this Article presumes a connection exists
between improper expert testimony and increasing medical malpractice
premiums.
III. STATE MEDICAL BOARDS ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE PARTY To
REGULATE PHYSICIAN EXPERT TESTIMONY
Medical societies, judges, and attorneys have tried to prevent improper
testimony.47 This section first explains that these alternative methods have
not prevented improper testimony. Next, it is explained that the threat of
professional discipline is the most effective way to prevent improper expert
witness testimony. Finally, it is demonstrated that imposing sanctions for
improper testimony is consistent with the purposes of regulating the practice
of medicine.
A. Alternative Mechanisms for 'Policing'Improper Testimony Are
Ineffective
1. Disciplinary Actions by Medical Professional Societies
Professional societies have become increasingly concerned with expert
testimony given by their members. The American Association of
Neurological Surgeons (AANS) was one of the first professional
associations to review expert witness testimony.48 Over the past fifteen
years, it has reviewed expert testimony given by approximately fifty
members and has disciplined about ten members. 49 The American College
of Radiology (ACR) recently expelled a member who gave inaccurate expert
testimony. ° Similarly, the Florida Medical Association (FMA) recently
adopted a peer review system to evaluate expert witness testimony.51 These
46. It appears that judges are "increasingly skeptical about the ethical standards of expert
witnesses." Harrison, supra note 3, at 254.
47. See discussion infra Part III.A.
48. Andrew D. Feld & William Carey, Expert Witness Malfeasance: How Should Specialty
Societies Respond?, AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY, May 2005, at 991.
49. The AANS has promulgated Rules and Regulations pertaining to expert witness testimony
given by its members. For example, the rules require that "the neurological expert witness shall
identify as such any personal opinions that vary significantly from generally accepted neurological
practice." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS
VII.A.3, available at http://www.aans.org/about/membership/ExpWitness03Dec04.pdf.
50. C.P. Kaiser, 'Expert' Witness Gets Booted from A CR, DIAGNOSTIC IMAGINING ONLINE (July
8, 2004), http://www.diagnosticimaging.com/dinews/2004070801.shtml.
51. Steve Ellman, Testimony, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REv., June 25, 2003, at 11. The expert's
testimony is evaluated by another expert from the same field, and the FMA's committee on ethical
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review programs give the relevant association authority to sanction
physicians for improper testimony.
The sanctioned physician may challenge an association's action in court.
Generally, disputes between an association and a member are governed by
contract law with an association's charter or bylaws defining the parties'
obligations.5 2  Courts generally do not require that an association have
written bylaws,53 but if there are written bylaws, they must be reasonable
and not arbitrarily enforced.54 An association's rules must be specific," and
any discipline must be authorized by that association's rules or bylaws.
6
Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a professional society
unless the sanctions violate public policy,57 the association acted in "bad
faith,"5 8 or membership in the organization is an important economic
interest. 59  Austin v. AANS, which upheld an expert witness review
program, 60  demonstrates that it is unlikely courts will interfere with
professional associations' expert witness review programs.
Arguably these programs violate public policy because they might
intimidate physician expert witnesses. For example, in Bernstein v.
Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n,61 a California court of appeals
refused to enforce an ethical rule prohibiting criticism of other treating
and judicial affairs may convene a hearing. Id. Disciplinary actions range from letters of concern to
suspension or expulsion from the medical society. Id. In 2004, a case was filed in the Circuit Court
of Leon County against the FMA by an expert witness who was accused of giving improper
testimony. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/I 1912.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). The expert alleged that FMA
peer review system was intimidating and deterred physicians from serving as expert witnesses for
plaintiffs. Id. The court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim but gave the plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint, which he did. Id. No final judgment has been rendered. Id.
52. Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 968 (2001).
53. E.g., Head v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 516 N.E.2d 921, 928 (II1. App. Ct. 1987).
54. E.g., Butler v. USA Volleyball, 673 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
55. See generally 1-2B THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS 2B.04 (2005) (explaining when it is
permissible for associations to require members to comply with association's bylaws and code of
conduct or ethics).
56. E.g., Van Daele v. Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728, 732 (I11. 972).
57. E.g., Yeomans v. Union League Club, 225 I11. App. 234, 242 (App. Ct. 1922).
58. E.g., Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2001).
59. E.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 796-97 (N.J. 1961).
60. Austin, 253 F.3d at 973-74. Dr. Austin was expelled from the AANS for providing improper
testimony for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action. Id. at 968. He challenged his expulsion
from the AANS which found that he gave improper testimony for a plaintiff in a malpractice suit.
The Seventh Circuit held that the AANS could sanction Dr. Austin. Id. at 972-73.
61. 293 P.2d 862 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
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physicians. 62 The court found that the ethical rule would make physicians
afraid to criticize other physicians.63 However, in Austin, the Seventh
Circuit held that the AANS expert testimony review program does not
intimidate potential expert witnesses. 64 The Austin court found that the
expert witness review policy promoted public policy interests by identifying
and sanctioning witnesses who give improper expert testimony. 6' Therefore,
based on the above examples, it is unlikely the argument that an expert
review program violates public policy will prevail in the future.66
Dr. Austin claimed the AANS acted in bad faith because it never
sanctioned members who testified for defendants. 67  However, the court
found that this was not proof of bad faith: it implies that because of the
inherent structure of such lawsuits, it is unlikely that any complaints would
be filed against defense experts.68 Complaints may be brought only by
member physicians who would be either the defendant physician or experts
testifying for the plaintiff or defense. 69  The court assumed a defendant
would be financially motivated to complain about an AANS member
testifying for the plaintiff.7° However, an expert witness would in actuality
have no incentive to complain about another member because the expert has
no financial stake in the litigation's outcome.71  Because of these
assumptions, the argument that a professional association acted in bad faith
by censuring a member who gave improper expert testimony will likely be
unsuccessful.
62. Id. at 865-66.
63. Id. at 865.
64. Austin, 253 F.3d at 972.
65. Id. at 973. See also Budwin v. Am. Psychological Ass'n, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 458 (Ct. App.
1994) (finding that professional association's discipline of a member who gave false testimony does
not violate public policy).
66. At least one circuit has found to the contrary. See L'Orange v. Med. Protective Co., 394 F.2d
57, 63 (6th Cir. 1968) (finding that an insurer's cancellation of a malpractice policy for the purpose
of intimidating a witness violated public policy).
67. Austin, 253 F.3d at 969.
68. Id. at 972. The court explains how this would be unlikely in this way:
If a member of the Association is sued for malpractice and another member gives
testimony for the plaintiff that the defendant believes is irresponsible, it is natural for the
defendant to complain to the Association; a fellow member has irresponsibly labeled him
negligent. If a member of the Association who testifies for a plaintiff happens to believe
that the defendant's expert witness was irresponsible, he is much less likely to complain,
because that expert (and fellow member of the Association) has not accused him of
negligence or harmed him in his practice or forced him to stand trial or gotten him into
trouble with his liability insurer.
Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 973-74.
71. See id. at 972.
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If membership in the association is an important economic interest, then
the member is entitled to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal,
adequate notice, and the opportunity to defend against the charges. 72  The
association must also provide evidence supporting the allegations. 3  In
Austin, Judge Posner explained both that an "important economic interest"
must be necessary to practice in the profession, and for such an interest to
exist, that membership in the particular professional society must be a
practical or de facto requirement for licensure.74 Moreover, the economic
injury suffered by the physician must be to the physician's principal source
of income, and Judge Posner assumed this comes from treating patients.75
Therefore, under Austin, it is doubtful a physician would be able to show
that membership in a professional association is an important economic
interest; 76 so, a professional association's expert testimony review program
can be informal."
Even though these expert testimony review programs will likely be
upheld in court, they will not solve the problem of improper expert witness
testimony. First, not all physicians belong to professional societies.
78
Second, the professional society may not be motivated to protect the
interests of the defendant physician because its primary interest is the
reputation of the profession; 79 therefore, it might not intervene in every case
of improper testimony. Third, if the disciplinary program is a peer review
72. See, e.g., Werner v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 137 N.E. 2d 100, 111-12 (stating that "courts
will interfere with the decision of an association ... if the accused member has not been afforded
those rudimentary rights ... includ[ing] notice ... and opportunity to be present and confront and
cross-examine his accusers and an opportunity to make a defense .... ).
73. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 218 v. Massie, 627 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246 (1971)).
74. Austin, 253 F.3d at 971.
75. See id. at 971-72.
76. This is at least true in cases where membership in the professional association is not a
prerequisite to the practice of a person's profession. Compare Falcone v. Middlesex County Med.
Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 794 (1971) (holding that the refusal of the local medical society to admit
plaintiff jeopardized his medical practice) with Austin, 253 F.3d at 971-72 (holding that the AANS's
regulation of Dr. Austin's expert witness testimony did not affect his medical practice, and further
that his association with the AANS was not mandatory to his practice).
77. The review process can be informal, but the association still must follow its bylaws which
might specify procedures that must be followed when members are sanctioned. See Van Daele v.
Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728, 732-33 (11. 1972) (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
78. Only 25% of practicing physicians belong to the AMA. Richard R. Johnston, Organized
Medicine: Do We Need AMA?, ASA NEWSLETTER, May 2001,
http://www.asahq.org/newsletters/2001/05_01/whatsnew0501 .htm.
79. Harrison, supra note 3, at 292.
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process, 8° reviewers might be subject to liability for malpractice, negligence,
and defamation.8 Fourth, peer review records are not confidential, and thus
may be disclosed in a medical malpractice action. 2 Most importantly,
medical societies do not have authority to revoke a physician's license. 83
Therefore, professional association review of expert testimony will not
prevent all improper expert testimony.
2. Rules of Evidence To Exclude Improper Expert Testimony
Two rules of evidence, the "general acceptance" test and the Daubert
test, give the trial judge authority to exclude expert testimony based on
faulty reasoning or bad science. Under the "general acceptance" test
established in Frye v. United States,84 expert witness testimony is reliable if
the expert's theory has gained "general acceptance" in the field.85 Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8 6 established a new test for the
admissibility of scientific testimony. In the federal courts and states that
have adopted Daubert, the trial judge acts as a "gatekeeper," allowing only
relevant and reliable evidence to be admitted.8 7  Under Daubert, opinion
testimony is reliable if the reasoning and methodology underlying the
opinion are scientifically valid. 88
Daubert and Frye were intended to keep juries from considering novel
scientific theories, but they have failed to exclude improper expert testimony
about standard of care in at least three ways. First, judges may be unable to
identify improper testimony, especially when the testimony involves highly
80. Peer review is a process where care provided by a physician is evaluated by other physicians.
See generally 1 FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-24 (discussing Medicare Utilization and Quality
Control Peer Review Organization Program).
81. Gary N. McAbee, Improper Expert Medical Testimony, 19 J. LEGAL MED., 257, 261 (1998).
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 grants physicians involved in the peer review
process immunity from liability for damages in civil actions. Id. (paraphrasing 42 U.S.C. §
1 ll(a)(l)). However, their immunity is not absolute because absolute immunity in civil cases is
only allowed in "exceptional situations" where public policy makes it essential. Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
82. McAbee, supra note 81, at 261.
83. Steve Ellman, Code of Silence, DAILY Bus. REV., June 25, 2003, available at
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/AwardStories/CodeOfSilence.html.
84. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
85. Id. at 1013-14.
86. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
87. Id. at 591-92.
88. A Daubert reliability analysis has two stages. Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert
Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2151-52 (2003). The trial judge first evaluates whether the
expert's conclusion could have been reached by the methodology. Id. Then, the judge evaluates
whether the expert properly applied the methodology. Id. at 2152.
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complex medical issues. 9 Second, only a handful of reported cases have
discussed the admissibility of standard of care evidence, indicating judges
are reluctant to exclude medical expert testimony under Daubert and Frye.90
Third, it is unclear whether Daubert applies to standard of care expert
testimony,91 because the foundational inquiry for this testimony is whether
the expert could have observed the custom, not whether the expert's opinion
is reliable. 92  Therefore, despite having a mechanism to evaluate the
reliability of expert testimony, judges are generally unable to use Daubert or
Frye to exclude improper standard of care testimony.
3. Exposing Improper Testimony Through Cross-Examination
The opposing attorney should try to expose bias, partisanship, or
financial interest during cross-examination. 93 During cross-examination, an
attorney may ask about the frequency with which the expert testifies for a
particular side94 and annual income derived from expert services. 95
89. A recent study indicated that some judges were unable to differentiate between theories
based on accepted scientific theories and theories grounded in speculation. Margaret Bull Kovera &
Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of
Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 574, 576 (2000);
see also Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons,, 253 F.3d 967, 972-73 (2002) ("Much
escapes [judges], especially in a highly technical field, such as neurosurgery. When a member of a
prestigious professional association makes representations not on their face absurd... the judge may
have no basis for questioning the belief, even if the defendant's expert testifies to the contrary.").
90. Cramm et al., supra note 41, at 723.
91. Id.at721.
92. Id. at 725.
93. See Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 121 (11. 1984).
94. In 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's expert could be questioned about
the frequency with which the expert testified for plaintiffs as well as the expert's annual income
derived from testifying as an expert witness. Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E. 2d 297, 302 (I11. 1988). The
defense argued that questioning should have been limited to questions about the expert's
compensation for testifying in a particular case. Id. at 300. However, the court found such evidence
to be relevant to show bias or whether the expert's opinion was skewed. Id. The court was
convinced that a financial advantage to the expert could extend beyond the particular case. Id. For
example, favorable verdicts can help an expert establish a good "track record" which can lead to
more income from testifying in the future. Id. The defense argued that allowing an expert to be
cross-examined about his or her annual income from testifying would necessarily require the
extensive testimony on collateral issues to rehabilitate the witness. Id. at 301. The court did not
believe that such testimony would necessitate a "lengthy and detailed 'rehabilitation' because such
testimony does not raise the implication that the expert's fees are unreasonable, only that the expert
has a financial interest in giving expert witness testimony. Id. (citation omitted). The court believed
that all that would be necessary to "rehabilitate" an expert witness about being questioned about his
or her annual income derived from testimony would be an explanation about how the expert
determines his or her fees. Id.
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However, it is difficult for an attorney to impeach improper testimony
during cross-examination. First, as one might assume, the expert will
probably know more about the scientific theories than the attorney and the
attorney may have insufficient resources to develop an effective cross-
examination. 96 Second, at its worst, cross-examination may provide the
expert with an opportunity to promote a theory detrimental to the cross-
examining attorney's case. 97 Therefore, the adversarial nature of a civil trial
does not necessarily mean all improper expert testimony will be exposed.
4. Subjecting Expert Witnesses to Liability for Improper Expert
Testimony
Several jurisdictions have permitted negligence suits against experts, 98
but most courts refuse to waive expert witness immunity. 99 Generally,
witnesses are immune to civil actions related to their testimony, 1° ° but some
courts have waived witness immunity for expert witnesses in cases involving
apparent recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse.0 1 Courts are more
95. McAbee, supra note 81, at 265. Early cases did not find it an abuse of discretion to exclude
evidence about compensation received by an expert for testifying in cases unrelated to the parties or
their attorneys. For example, an Illinois case from the early twentieth century held that an expert
witness could not be questioned about how often he had testified for a given category of party.
McMahon v. Chicago City Ry. Co, 88 N.E. 223 (Il. 1909). The court concluded that it was error for
a plaintiff injured in a collision with a train to ask a defendant's expert witness how many times he
had previously testified against other streetcar lines. Id.
96. McAbee, supra note 81, at 264.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Mattco Forge Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 790 (Ct. App. 1992)
(allowing action against accounting firm retained as an expert alleging the firm misrepresented its
credentials); Murphy v. A.A. Matthews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 682 (Mo. 1992) (holding that witness
immunity did not bar suit against professional expert witness alleging negligence in forming
opinion); see also Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 398-99 (N.J. 1984) (allowing negligence
action against court-appointed expert accountant alleging accountant did not use due care in
preparing reports).
99. See, e.g., Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding court-appointed
custody evaluators were entitled to judicial immunity); Riemers v. O'Halloran, 678 N.W.2d 547,
548-49 (N.D. 2004) (holding that court-appointed forensic accountants were entitled to witness
immunity); Bruce v. Bryne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Wash. 1989)
(holding that an expert witness retained by a party nonetheless was entitled to witness immunity).
100. See Davis v. Wallace, 565 S.E.2d 386, 396 (W. Va. 2002). Expert witnesses also have
"quasi-judicial" immunity in some states. "Quasi-judicial" immunity is given to persons, other than
judges, who act in a judicial manner. Marshall L. Wilde, The Liability of Alaska Mental Health
Providers for Mandated Treatment, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 271, 274 (2003). The immunity covers (1)
making of binding decisions, (2) making of findings or recommendations to the court, or (3)
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, evaluation, or other resolution of pending disputes. Howard v.
Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897-98 (Ct. App. 1990).
101. See generally Sullivan v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654, 660 (N.D. II1. 1994) (allowing action
by parents against psychologist for intentionally causing estrangement with their daughter). Courts
have also allowed lawsuits against court-appointed experts if the parties relied upon the expert's
opinion. E.g., Marrogi v. Howard, 805 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (La. 2002) (holding that expert was not
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likely to waive witness immunity for a suit against a "friendly" expert, i.e.,
an expert retained by the party bringing the suit.10 2 Witnesses were granted
immunity because they might be afraid to testify or might give distorted
testimony. 10 3  Arguably, this reasoning does not apply to what is a
commercial market for expert testimony: Witnesses afraid of liability can
simply charge more for their testimony. 10 4  Regardless, the public policy
justification for immunity is well-established, even if the reasoning may not
apply to expert witnesses.'05 Therefore, most courts will likely uphold
witness immunity for expert testimony, at least for "unfriendly" experts.
B. State Medical Boards Are the Most Effective and Appropriate
Regulators of Expert Witness Testimony
As discussed above in Part II.A, the state allows the medical profession
to regulate itself because physicians can better evaluate another physician's
competency than non-physicians. 10 6  Consequently, groups such as the
American Medical Association (AMA) urge subjecting expert witness
testimony to a "peer review" process where the physician's testimony would
be evaluated by a group of physicians. 10 7  Review by a state medical
licensure board is similar to peer review because most medical board
members are physicians.'0 5  Unlike private associations, state medical
boards may revoke a physician's license. 10 9 Because physicians cannot
practice medicine without a license, the threat of professional discipline is
immune from suit where he prepared erroneous report that caused plaintiff to file a motion to compel
based on that report).
102. Harrison, supra note 3, at 286.
103. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983). But see Harrison, supra note 3, at 257
(arguing that "Briscoe fits awkwardly into the expert witness context.").
104. Harrison, supra note 3, at 257, 290.
105. See generally Wilde, supra note 100 (exploring the extension of the doctrine of judicial
immunity or quasi-judicial immunity to mental health officials). The article goes on to mention
several public policy considerations in expanding such immunity, including, among others, the "taint
of exercise and discretion in ... actions and testimony." Id. at 274-75.
106. In addition to the above discussion, see Coe v. United States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411, 414
(10th Cir. 1982).
107. Tanya Albert, Expert Witness Sues Critics, AMEDNEWS.COM (June 28, 2004),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/06/28/prII0628.htm.
108. E.g., statutes cited supra note 24.
109. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney 2002).
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the most effective way to enforce minimum standards of physician
conduct. "o
C. Regulation of Expert Witness Testimony Is Consistent with the Purpose
of Regulating Medicine
State licensure allows consumers to assume physicians meet minimal
levels of competency. 1 ' This is achieved in three ways: first, state
regulation establishes entry requirements, thereby controlling quality of
medical care; second, it sets forth standards of professional conduct for
physicians; and third, it provides a means of enforcing these standards
through the threat of disciplinary actions."12  Accordingly, the primary
purpose of the regulation of medicine is to protect the public from
incompetent physicians.' The assumption underlying this purpose is that
the state can better monitor the professional conduct of physicians than can
individual consumers. 1,
Arguably, this justification does not apply to expert witness testimony.
The opposing attorney in a medical malpractice case is hardly in the same
position as a consumer of healthcare services. The other side may hire its
own medical expert who can identify improper testimony without the state's
help. However, this argument is short-sighted because it assumes the only
one harmed by improper testimony is the opposing party. In fact, the public
is also harmed because of the presumed connection between rising
malpractice premiums and improper expert testimony." 5 The harm to the
parties from improper testimony is different from the harm to the public, 1
6
so neither attorney will adequately protect the public's interests. Therefore,
this justification for regulating the medical profession also applies to
regulating expert witness testimony.
110. See, e.g., Deatherage v. State Examining Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828, 832 (Wash. 1997)
(arguing that threat of professional discipline is an "appropriate check" on witnesses who are civilly
immune). But see Harrison, supra note 3, at 292 (arguing peer review will not prevent improper
expert testimony because the adversely affected party has no financial motivation to bring a
complaint).
111. SIMON ROTTENBERG, Introduction to OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 2-3
(Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980).
112. Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate Telemedicine
Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1,6. (1999).
113. See generally I FURROw, supra note 16, at § 3-1 (discussing "market failure," i.e.,
consumers' inability to assess quality of care, as a justification for restrictive licensure).
114. See Sulentic, supra note 112, at 5.
115. IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS, supra note 34, at 5-6 (finding that, in an attempt to
curtail increased medical malpractice insurance premiums, physicians and medical facilities both
reduce access to services and/or practice defensive medicine. However, the GAO report also found
that rural locations contribute to the access problem).
116. The only party harmed by the improper testimony would be the party who loses the lawsuit.
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A secondary purpose of state regulation is to protect the image of the
medical profession. 1 7  Arguably, safeguarding the medical profession's
image does not serve the public interest.8 However, protecting the image
of the profession furthers legitimate state interests.119 For example, people
might not seek medical treatment if they do not trust physicians. 2 °
Improper testimony tarnishes the image of the medical profession; therefore,
preventing improper testimony serves the purpose of the state regulation of
medicine.
IV. STATE MEDICAL BOARDS HAVE AN EXISTING FRAMEWORK UPON
WHICH To EXPAND AND PROMULGATE REGULATIONS REGARDING
IMPROPER EXPERT TESTIMONY
Every state has a medical practice act delegating authority to a medical
board to discipline physicians. ' 2  Statutory grounds for discipline are found
in these acts. 22 Typical grounds for discipline include: obtaining a license
to practice medicine by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 23 practicing
medicine fraudulently or incompetently; 124 practicing medicine while under
117. See Levy v. Bd. of Registration & Discipline in Med., 392 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Mass. 1979).
Critics claim that professional regulation serves the profession more than the public and slows
innovation in the profession. E.g., Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in
Health-Care Providers' Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301,
316 (2002).
118. See Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
119. See Levy, 392 N.E.2d at 1041 ("The revocation of a physician's license ... [is] to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.").
120. See Julia E. Connelly & Courtney Campbell, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical
Offices, 147 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1829, 1831-32 (1987) (finding that reasons for refusing
medical intervention included distrust of physicians).
121. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4731.01 (LexisNexis 2003). State medical boards rarely discipline physicians; however, the number
of disciplinary actions brought by medical boards has increased significantly in the past ten years.
Francis H. Miller, Medical Discipline in the Twenty-First Century: Are Purchases the Answer?, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31,41-42 (1997).
122. 1 FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-20.
123. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1121 (I11. 1992)
(finding that misrepresentations have to be material to warrant discipline).
124. E.g., Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Lopez-Samayoa, 887 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1994)
(allowing suspension of physician's license for failing to meet generally accepted standards of
medical practice); Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 436 P.2d 828, 837 (Kan. 1968)
(upholding suspension of physician who demonstrated extreme incompetence); Levesque v. Bd. of
Osteopathic Examination & Registration, 1994 Me. Super. LEXIS 18 (Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1994)
(allowing discipline of physician who tried to cover up an inaccurate sponge count). See generally I
FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-23 (discussing specific grounds for disciplinary actions). It is
uncertain whether one instance of negligence is enough to justify discipline. Glenn E. Bradford &
the influence of alcohol or drugs or a physical or mental disability;'25
habitual addiction to alcohol or narcotics; 116 conviction of a crime; 27
engaging in dishonorable, immoral, or unprofessional conduct; 12 8 or
violating the rules of the state medical board. 2 9 According to a study of
state medical boards, most believe these grounds give them authority to
discipline physicians who give improper testimony. 130
This section first discusses whether boards have authority to consider
improper expert testimony to be an immoral activity or unprofessional
conduct. 13' Next, this section next examines whether medical boards may
consider the giving of improper testimony to be the incompetent or negligent
practice of medicine. 132 Finally, this section proposes modifications to the
existing disciplinary framework to adequately regulate expert witness
testimony. 133
David G. Meyers, The Legal and Regulatory Climate in the State of Missouri for Complementary
and Alternative Medicine-Honest Disagreement Among Competent Physicians or Medical
McCarthyism?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 55, 59-60 (2001).
125. E.g., Arkansas State Med. Bd. v. Young, 1994 Ark. App. LEXIS 407 (Ark. Ct. App.. Sept. 7,
1994) (allowing discipline of physician who attempted suicide); Corder v. Kansas Bd. of Healing
Arts, 889 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1994) (allowing suspension of physician who expressed belief in
unidentified flying objects and extraterrestrial beings).
126. E.g., Colorado State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Colo. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that statute defining unprofessional conduct as including "habitual intemperance"
was not vague).
127. E.g., Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 159 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1942) (upholding suspension of
physician convicted of mail fraud). Some statutes require conviction of a felony. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 34-24-360(4) (LexisNexis 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 148.6(b) (West 2003). Other statutes
do not specify whether the crime must be a felony. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(c) (West
2001). If the statute is silent about whether the conviction must be for a felony conviction, courts
often find that a physician can be suspended for a misdemeanor conviction. E.g., Krain v. Med. Bd.
of Cal., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 590-91 (Ct. App. 1999).
128. See, e.g., Storrs v. State Med. Bd., 664 P.2d 547 (Alaska 1983) (revoking medical license for
"professional incompetence" under the state statute); Moran v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 196 P.2d 20,
22 (Cal. 1948) (disciplining for "unprofessional conduct" in prescription practices); McKay v. Bd. of
Med. Exam'rs, 788 P.2d 476, 479 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that under the state statute, "the
Board may discipline a physician for 'unprofessional or dishonorable conduct."').
129. E.g., Bamgrover v. Med. Licensure Comm'n of Ala., 852 So. 2d 147, 149 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (allowing discipline of physician who made an untrue statement during an investigation by the
state medical licensure board).
130. Douglas R. Eitel et al., Medicine on Trial: Physicians' Attitudes about Expert Medical
Testimony, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 345, 350 (1997).
131. See discussion infra notes 134-90 and accompanying text.
132. See discussion infra notes 191-229 and accompanying text.
133. See discussion infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
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A. Is Improper Testimony Unprofessional Conduct or Immoral Conduct?
Medical boards may discipline a physician for "unprofessional
conduct,"1 34 but it is uncertain whether courts will uphold disciplinary
actions based on the assertion that giving improper testimony is
unprofessional conduct. 1
35
The first issue courts will consider is whether the giving of improper
testimony is unprofessional or immoral conduct. Several courts have
considered whether improper expert testimony given by psychologists was
unprofessional conduct, and their reasoning should apply to cases analyzing
disciplinary actions against physicians. 136 The next issue is whether giving
expert testimony is sufficiently related to the practice of medicine to warrant
discipline as unprofessional conduct. Many courts have addressed the
"related to" requirement so it will not be a matter of initial review.1 3' As
explained infra at Part IV.A.1, most courts will likely defer to the board's
decision that giving improper testimony is unprofessional conduct
sufficiently related to the practice of medicine.
1. Is Giving Improper Testimony Unprofessional Conduct?
Most medical practice acts give examples of behavior that is
unprofessional conduct but allow the board to find other conduct to be
unprofessional as well.' 38 Some acts delegate authority to the medical board
to define unprofessional conduct. 139  Other statutes define unprofessional
conduct as conduct that fails to comply with the profession's ethical
134. For example, the Delaware Medical Practices Act allows discipline for "any dishonorable or
unethical conduct likely to deceive, defraud or harm the public." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1731(b)(3) (2004). The Kansas Healing Arts Act allows a physician to be disciplined for
committing an "act of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct .. " KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836(b)
(2003).
135. It seems clear that false testimony is unprofessional conduct. See In re the Medical License
of Dr. Reuben Setliff, M.D., 645 N.W.2d 601, 606 (S.D. 2002). However, only one published case
has dealt directly with the issue of disciplinary action based on improper expert testimony as
unprofessional conduct. See Joseph v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1991).
136. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
137. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
138. For example, the California Business and Professions Code specifies that "unprofessional
conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following.. .(e) The commission of any act involving
dishonesty or corruption which is substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a
physician and surgeon." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (Deering 2003).
139. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-15.D (2003), ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-16-503 (2004).
standards. 140  Therefore, what conduct is considered to be unprofessional
varies from state to state.
Courts have struggled to define unprofessional conduct because it is an
ambiguous term and may be defined in many different ways, 14 1 but courts
usually discuss it in reference to integrity.142  Another way to understand
unprofessional conduct is failure to comply with the profession's ethical
standards. 143  Cases analyzing disciplinary actions against psychologist
expert witnesses for unprofessional conduct provide two specific examples
of unprofessional conduct. First, forming an opinion without performing the
necessary tests is unprofessional conduct. 144 Second, failure to qualify one's
opinion is unprofessional conduct. 14' As discussed infra, courts accepting
these definitions of unprofessional conduct would likely uphold a finding
that giving improper testimony is unprofessional conduct.
Because the public should be able to trust professionals, any conduct
calling a physician's integrity into question is unprofessional conduct.
146
However, improper testimony, i.e., testimony not based on sound medical
theories, is not dishonest. Nevertheless, an expert demonstrates dishonesty
by testifying that the minority position is the medical custom. 147 Moreover,
140. For example, in Oregon, "unprofessional conduct" is defined as "any conduct or practice
contrary to recognized standards of ethics of the medical ... profession .... " OR. REV. STAT. §
677.188(4)(a) (2003). In Ohio, the Medical Board can discipline a physician for the "violation of
any provision of a code of ethics of the American Medical Association .... OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4731.22(B)(1 8) (2003). In Hawaii, a physician can be disciplined for "conduct or practice
contrary to recognized standards of ethics of the medical profession as adopted by the Hawaii
Medical Association or the American Medical Association." HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-8(a)(9) (Cum.
Supp. 2004).
141. Statutory definitions of "practice of medicine" have been challenged for vagueness but most
courts have refused to find them to be unconstitutionally vague. For example, in Michigan v.
Rogers, 641 N.W.2d 595, 611-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), the Court of Appeals of Michigan refused
to find the Michigan medical practice act was unconstitutionally vague simply because it provided
notice of criminal prosecution and gave discretion to police.
142. E.g., Foster v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 278 Cal. Rptr. 117, 119 (Ct. App. 1991)
(finding intentional dishonesty shows a fundamental lack of moral character which is needed to
maintain physician-patient relationship); Windham v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr.
566, 570 (Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to believe that someone who cheated the government could be
considered honest in dealings with patients). But see Abrahamson v. Dep't of Prof I Regulation, 909
N.E.2d 1111, 1121 (I11. 1992) (finding that misrepresentations have to be material to warrant
discipline).
143. See generally Dobash, supra note 27, at 1752 (discussing cases where courts relied on
professional ethics to determine if doctor's sexual behavior was professional misconduct). But see
Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487, 492 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that medical ethics code is not binding
law and therefore not applicable to issues before the court).
144. Cochran v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 15 P.3d 73, 76 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Loomis v. Bd.
of Psychologist Exam'rs, 954 P.2d 839, 843 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
145. Deatherage v. State Examining Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828, 829 (Wash. 1997).
146. See Levy v. Bd. of Registration & Discipline in Med., 392 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Mass. 1979).
147. A minority medical position is not the medical custom. See I FURROW, supra note 16, at §
6-2 (explaining that the medical profession establishes the relevant standard of care in each case).
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an expert who bases an opinion on a minority theory demonstrates lack of
respect for the law because the law requires experts to testify about what
medical custom is, not what the expert thinks is right. 148 Therefore, experts
who knowingly provide improper expert testimony demonstrate a lack of
integrity.
The second way of looking at unprofessional conduct, as a deviation
from ethical standards, is likely to support a finding that improper testimony
is unprofessional conduct, because the AMA's ethical code criticizes
improper expert testimony. 149  Several courts have looked to ethical
standards when reviewing disciplinary actions and believe patients have a
reasonable expectation that physicians will comply with professional
ethics. 5 ° However, this is not universally accepted,' 51 so it is uncertain
whether ethical codes condemning improper testimony will support
disciplinary actions against physicians who give improper testimony.
Several cases analyzing disciplinary actions against psychologists have
held that basing an opinion on mere speculation is unprofessional conduct.
In Cochran v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, an Oregon court found that
a psychologist violated the board's ethical code by speculating about a
criminal defendant's future dangerousness without performing a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background.152 In another Oregon case,
Loomis v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, the court found that an expert
witness had violated the board's ethical code of conduct when she submitted
an affidavit containing inappropriate recommendations.' 53  The
psychologist's client was involved in a child custody dispute with her
husband. 15 4 The psychologist submitted an affidavit supporting her client's
motion to modify a custody order and testified at a hearing on the motion
without examining her client's husband.'55 It follows by analogy that a
148. See generally 1 FURROW, supra note 16, at § 6-2.
149. See discussion supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. See Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that
patients should be able to assume that physicians will comply with the profession's ethics); Perez v.
Missouri State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 803 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that disciplinary statutes are in place to protect the public); Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd.,
818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991) (finding that medical disciplinary proceedings are in place to
protect both the public and the "standing of the medical profession in the eyes of the public").
151. See Dobash, supra note 27, at 1748 (discussing cases where courts refused to apply the
profession's ethical standards).
152. Cochran v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 15 P.3d 71, 75-76 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
153. Loomis v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 954 P.2d 830, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 840-41.
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medical board would be justified in disciplining experts who do not base
their opinions on generally accepted medical theories.
One case has explained that failing to qualify expert testimony was
unprofessional conduct. In Deatherage v. Examining Board of Psychology,
a Washington court allowed the psychologist's board to discipline a
psychologist for his testimony in several custody actions. 156  The board
found that the psychologist: (1) had failed to qualify his statements properly,
(2) had mischaracterized his statements, (3) had failed to verify information,
and (4) improperly interpreted test data. 157 The court upheld the disciplinary
action because it was consistent with the "court's goal of accurate testimony
from expert witnesses, and furthers the disciplinary board's goal of
protecting the public."' 58 It follows that an expert who provides improper
testimony without qualifying it as a minority position could be found to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct.
This issue is more settled in California because its Attorney General
recently issued an opinion stating that physicians may be subject to
professional discipline based on their expert testimony. 59 The opinion
stated that expert testimony showing "dishonesty, poor character, a lack of
integrity, and an inability or unwillingness to follow the law" is
unprofessional conduct related to the practice of medicine. 60 Whether the
California medical board will be able to discipline physicians who give
improper testimony seems to depend on whether the expert knew his or her
opinion was inconsistent with established medical customs.
2. Is Giving Improper Testimony "Related To" the Practice of
Medicine?
The physician's misconduct must usually be "related to" the practice of
medicine to warrant discipline. 161 States take two approaches to the "related
156. Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828, 829 (Wash. 1997).
157. Id. at 829.
158. Id. at 832.
159. 87 Op. Att'y Gen. 48 (Cal. A.G. 2004).
160. Id. at 52 (quoting Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (2002)). See also In re
the Medical License of Dr. Reuben Setliff, M.D., 645 N.W.2d 601 (S.D. 2002) (allowing
disciplinary action for false testimony in a medical malpractice suit). See also supra notes 141-48
and accompanying text for a discussion of whether giving improper testimony is dishonest behavior.
161. Most state's licensing acts specify that the conduct must be related to the physician's
practice. The Washington Uniform Disciplinary Act allows discipline for acts "involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption relating to the practice of the person's profession." WASH. REV.
CODE § 18.130.180(1) (2004). Another example is the Maryland Medical Practice Act, which
allows discipline when a physician "[i]s guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct in the practice
of medicine." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404(a)(3) (West 2004). Even if not required by
statute, most courts require that the conduct be related to the practice of medicine. See Griffiths v.
Med. Bd. of Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 453 (Ct. App. 2002) (requiring a "nexus" between the
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to" requirement: the majority "liberal" approach and the minority "direct
relationship" approach. Courts accepting the majority approach are more
likely to uphold a finding that giving improper testimony is related to the
practice of medicine.
Under the majority approach, almost anything a physician does is
related to the practice of medicine. 162  A physician's "unfitness" need not
relate to the "specific skills needed" to practice medicine1 63 or impair the
physician's practice of medicine. 164 Underlying the majority approach is the
assumption that the public has the right to expect "good character" from
physicians. 1
65
Under the majority approach, physicians may be disciplined for offenses
indicating weakness of character. 166 Courts have upheld the discipline of
physicians for: income tax fraud, 167 entering a guilty plea to a felony charge
of solicitation of perjury, 16 a felony conviction for filing false or fraudulent
physician's misconduct and his or her "fitness or competence to practice medicine"); Chastek v.
Anderson, 416 N.E.2d 247 (I11. 981) (finding that statute allowing license revocation for "improper,
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" provided adequate notice of disallowed acts). Some courts
have found that state statutes allowing discipline for the conviction of a felony do not require that
that the felony be connected to the practice of medicine. E.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., Ill N.E.2d 222, 225-26 (N.Y. 1953) (allowing suspension of medical license for committing a
crime unrelated to medical practice). Even if not found within the statute, due process standards
require that there be a "rational connection" between the grounds for discipline and the "capacity to
practice." Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (holding that denial
of law license because of past Communist Party affiliation did not have a rational connection to the
practice of law).
162. Some California cases discus a "nexus" between the physician's misconduct and his or her
"fitness or competence to practice medicine." E.g., Griffiths, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
163. Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991); see also Raymond v.
Bd. of Registration in Med., 443 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 1982) (allowing disciplinary action for criminal
conviction even though crime did not relate to the physician's medical practice); Barsky v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 111 N.E.2d 222, 225-26 (N.Y. 1953) (same).
164. E.g., Griffiths, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457.
165. Erdman v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 261 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (App. Div.
1965). There is also the fear that intellectual power without "uprightness of character" might be
more harmful to patients than ignorance. Lawrence v. Briry, 132 N.E. 174, 176 (Mass. 1921).
166. But see Cartwright v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 548 P.2d 1134 (Cal. 1976) (finding that
conviction of a chiropractor for keeping or willfully residing in a house of ill fame did not warrant
revocation of his license to practice medicine because there was no evidence the chiropractor
misused his professional license).
167. See, e.g., Bills v. Weaver, 544 P.2d 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Windham v. Bd. of Med.
Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1980); In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (Wash.
1958); State v. Margoles, 124 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1963).
168. E.g., Krain v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586 (Ct. App. 1999).
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insurance claims, 16 9 drunk driving offenses,17 trying to obtain lenient
treatment for an indicted defendant, 171 conspiring to influence a judge, 172
selling examination questions and answers, 73 plagiarism, 174 lying about
board certifications or hospital affiliations, 75 giving false and evasive
answers at a deposition and lying under oath,176 and lying about academic
credentials. 71 Courts following the liberal approach will likely accept that
giving improper testimony is unprofessional conduct if they believe it
indicates dishonesty. 17
8
It is less certain whether courts in minority "direct relationship" states
will accept that giving improper testimony is unprofessional conduct. These
states require a direct connection between the physician's conduct and the
practice of medicine. 179 Discipline is allowed only when the physician's
conduct is related to "matters pertaining essentially to the diagnosis, care or
treatment of patients."'' 80  Direct relationship courts have found these
activities insufficiently related to the practice of medicine: operating a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 18' being convicted on six courts
of petty larceny, 182 making a false statement on an application for staff
privileges; 183 and intimidating a witness. 184 It appears that these courts will
not uphold a finding that giving improper testimony is unprofessional
conduct because in these states, conduct indicating a "weakness of
character" is seemingly not sufficiently related to the practice of medicine.
However, whether the relationship is direct enough to satisfy these
courts may depend on how the court characterizes the physician's
169. E.g., Matanky v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 144 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Ct. App. 1978); Roy v. Ohio
State Med. Bd., 610 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
170. Griffiths v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445,452-53 (Ct. App. 2002).
171. Erdman v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 261 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (App.
Div. 1965).
172. Id.
173. Pepe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 295 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1968).
174. Alsabti v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 536 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1989).
175. Lazachek v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 475 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1984).
176. Sneed v. Stovall, 22 S.W.3d 277, 279-80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
177. Joseph v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. 1991).
178. See supra Part IV.A.1 for discussion of whether courts will accept that improper testimony is
dishonest.
179. E.g., Gromis v. Med. Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 458 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
unprofessional conduct must affect the physician's treatment of the patient); Atienza v. Taub, 239
Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 n.3 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the "substantially related" requirement means
that the conduct occurs under the guise of treatment).
180. E.g., McDonnell v. Comm'n on Med. Discipline, 483 A.2d 76, 80 (Md. 1984).
181. Griffiths v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445,461 (Ct. App. 2002).
182. Hummel v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 87 P.2d 248 (Colo. 1939).
183. Elmariah v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 574 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
184. Meyer v. McDonnell, 392 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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misconduct.185 If the court sees improper testimony merely as an indication
of "bad character," then there is no direct relationship with the practice of
medicine. 186  However, it seems intuitive that improper testimony shows
something more than bad character.'8 7 An expert witness "renders an
opinion based on his application of scientific principles in diagnosing and
treating physical diseases."'' 88  Therefore, arguably an expert witness is
practicing medicine when offering expert testimony. 189 If the court defines
the giving of expert testimony as the practice of medicine, obviously it
should be sufficiently related to the practice of medicine to count as such. 190
B. Is Giving Improper Testimony Negligent or Incompetent Practice of
Medicine?
State medical boards have authority to discipline physicians for
negligently or incompetently practicing medicine. 19' Whether giving
improper expert witness testimony is the negligent or incompetent practice
of medicine depends on whether an expert is practicing medicine. 92 A 1997
survey found that most medical boards do not believe giving expert witness
testimony is the practice of medicine. 193 However, most physicians believe
an expert witness is practicing medicine. 194
185. See discussion infra Part IV.B.l.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Joseph v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. 1991).
189. See infra Part IV.B. 1, for a discussion about whether giving medical expert testimony is the
practice of medicine. In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards amended its model medical
practice act to define the giving of "false, fraudulent or deceptive testimony" by a "medical
professional while serving as an expert witness" as unprofessional conduct warranting discipline.
FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, A GUIDE TO THE ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL
PRACTICE ACT (10th ed. 2003), available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2003-
grpolModem MedicalPracticeAct.pdf.
190. But see Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that testifying as an expert is not the practice of medicine, so
disciplinary action for unprofessional conduct was not allowed).
191. See I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-23 (explaining that boards can discipline physicians for
failing to comply with specific standards of practice).
192. Eitel, supra note 130, at 350.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 347-48. In one study, 59.4% of surveyed physicians stated that acting as an expert
witness was the "practice of medicine." Id. Interestingly, physicians who had testified as expert
witnesses were more likely to define expert witness testimonial activity as the "practice of medicine"
than physicians without expert witness experience. Id. at 348.
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1. What is the Practice of Medicine?
State medical practice acts provide the framework for determining what
activities fall within the "practice of medicine." Most modem medical
practice acts share a variation of the same definition: that the practice of
medicine is the diagnosis, treatment, prescription, or prevention of a disease,
ailment, injury, or other condition.' 95 Some statutes specify that certain
activities such as tattooing fall within the practice of medicine. 196  Almost
every activity related to health or sickness conceivably falls within the
practice of medicine.' 97 The outer limits of the practice of medicine appear
to be only medical services not usually performed by physicians. 1
98
Cases analyzing non-traditional medical practices indicate that at its
core, the practice of medicine involves the application of medical
judgment.'99 Courts generally require that the medical judgment be "carried
out," i.e., applied to a particular case.2 °°
195. E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical Malpractice,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 954 (1999). For example, the District of Columbia Medical Practice
Act defines the practice of medicine as "the application of scientific principles to prevent, diagnose,
and treat physical and mental diseases, disorders, and conditions and to safeguard the life and health
of any woman and infant through pregnancy and parturition." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-1201.02(7)
(2004).
196. For example, the Indiana Medical Practice Act defines tattooing as the practice of medicine.
IND. CODE § 25-22.5-1-1.1(a)(1)(c) (2004). Many statutes include a "holding out" requirement, i.e.,
"[t]he practice of medicine.. means the holding out of one's self to the public as being engaged in
the business of, or the actual engagement in, the diagnosing, treating, curing, or relieving of any
bodily or mental disease .. " LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1262(1) (West 2004).
197. In State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio 1975), a court held that a medical license was
necessary to practice acupuncture. The court concluded that because acupuncture consisted of
inserting needles beneath the skin for the purpose of treating pain, infirmity, or disease, it falls
within the practice of medicine. Id. However, some courts apply a slightly less broad definition of
practice of medicine. In Hicks v. Arkansas State Medical Board, 537 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ark. 1976),
the Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed with the state medical board that ear-piercing constituted the
practice of medicine. The Board argued that ear-piercing was a surgical procedure because it
involved "the penetration of the epidermis by mechanical instruments or appliances." Id. at 795.
The court looked to the "ordinary and usually accepted meaning" of surgery and found that it must
involve a more complicated procedure than ear-piercing. Id. at 795-96. Similarly, in People v.
Lehrman, 12 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 1937), the New York Court of Appeals found that the statutory
definition of practice of medicine was never intended to encompass electrolysis even though it
involved the penetration of the skin with an electrically charged needle.
198. Physicians need not perform these services because they do not involve a "medical
judgment." For example, a court found that performing routine pelvic examinations was not the
practice of medicine because these examinations are routinely performed by physician assistants.
Biogenetics, Ltd. v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 431 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (Ill. 1982). Another court found
that services routinely performed by nurses did not fall within the "practice of medicine" because the
nurses acted under the direction of physicians. Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo.
1983) (refusing to "define and draw that thin and elusive line that separates the practice of medicine
and the practice of professional nursing in modem day delivery of health services.").
199. Morreim, supra note 195, at 963.
200. Id.
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The one universally accepted element of the practice of medicine is the
utilization of medical judgment.20 ' For example, in Kelley v. Texas State
Board of Medical Examiners, a Texas court held that authoring a pamphlet
about cancer was the practice of medicine.2 °2 Under the Kelley court's
rationale, writing a book about cancer treatment is similar to testifying as a
medical expert, so it follows from this case that testifying would be the
practice of medicine. However, Kelley is an isolated case, and it seems
intuitive that the practice of medicine must be more than an "intellectual
,,203
exercise.
The physician must do more than contemplate a patient's condition:
medical judgment must be applied to a particular case. 2°  Accordingly,
courts have found that the following activities fall within the practice of
medicine: giving advice to health food store customers about foods they
should eat after listening to descriptions of their symptoms, 20 5 advising
patients about obesity and nervousness, 20 6 and examining patients and
writing prescriptions.2 °7 These activities are similar to providing expert
witness testimony because an expert reviews the treatment provided to the
patient to determine the standard of care. However, the expert reviews the
case after the treatment has been given, so arguably it is not "carried out.
208
Another element that might be necessary is that the applied medical
judgment be carried out.20 9 However, it is uncertain what the carried out
requirement entails. Must the physician treat the patient? Or rather, must
the physician's medical judgment affect the patient in some specific way?
If treatment of a particular patient is a necessary element of the practice
of medicine, then a physician whose advice is rejected is not practicing
medicine. Moreover, a clinical pathologist who only diagnoses a patient
would not be practicing medicine. Most modem medical practice acts
specify that the practice of medicine is more than the mere treatment of a
201. Id.
202. 467 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). But see Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp.
1216 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the publisher of a medical textbook owed no duty of care to
readers of the textbook).
203. See Jones, 694 F. Supp. at 1216.
204. Morreim, supra note 195, at 963.
205. See Pinkus v. MacMahon, 29 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1943).
206. People v. Cantor, 18 Cal. Rptr. 363, 365-66 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1961).
207. See People v. Varas 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1985); Siddiqui v. Ill. Dept. of Prof'l
Regulation, 718 N.E.2d 217, 225 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999).
208. Morreim, supra note 195, at 963.
209. Id. at 963 (arguing that a medical judgment must be "carried out," i.e., that it must determine
or at least significantly influence the type of care provided to a patient).
patient: the statutes define the practice of medicine as "the diagnosis,
treatment, prescription, or prevention of human disease."'2 ° Accordingly, in
Composite State Board of Medical Examiners v. Hertell, the Georgia Court
of Appeals upheld the suspension of a physician for practicing medicine
under the influence of alcohol. 21' Even though Dr. Hertell did not treat a
patient, the court found that he had practiced medicine while under the
influence because he had made a medical judgment when he reviewed a
patient's chart and determined necessary tests had been performed.2 2
Therefore, the fact that testifying does not involve the treatment of a patient
should not prevent a board from concluding it falls within the practice of
medicine.2 13
Several cases indicate the carried out requirement means the medical
judgment must affect or have the possibility of affecting the patient. In
Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, a Missouri
appellate court overturned a disciplinary action against an expert witness
who gave false testimony.2 14 The court held that giving expert testimony
was not the practice of medicine because an expert neither "diagnoses" nor
"treats" a patient.21 5 In Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners,21 6 an
Arizona court held that a physician performing prospective utilization
review 2 1 was practicing medicine because his decisions could "adversely
affect" a patient's health.21 8  However, in Morris v. District of Columbia
Board of Medicine, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected such an "open-
ended" definition of "treatment., 219  Since expert witness testimony is
210. Id. at 955.
211. 295 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
212. Id. at226.
213. But see Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that doctor who testified as expert witness but did not treat patient was
not practicing medicine).
214. Id. The Missouri medical board attempted to discipline Dr. Levine for giving false answers
under oath while testifying as an expert witness. Id. at 441. Dr. Levine testified that he passed his
boards on his fourth attempt when in fact he passed his exam on his fifth attempt. Id.
215. Id. at443.
216. 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
217. Prospective utilization is a process where a referral for a service is reviewed by a physician
who determines if it is medically necessary. The reviewer determines whether the requested service
will be covered by the patient's insurance. See Tom J. Manos, Comment, Take Half an Aspirin and
Call Your HMO in the Morning-Medical Malpractice in Managed Care: Are HMOs Practicing
Medicine Without a License?, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 195, 216 (1998).
218. Murphy v. Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
219. Morris v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1997). A minority of
courts agree with the Morris court that utilization review is not the "practice of medicine." For
example, in Adnan Varol, M.D., P.C. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 708 F. Supp. 826, 832
(E.D. Mich. 1989), a federal court held that neither prospective nor retrospective utilization review
was the practice of medicine. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-33 (5th Cir.
1992), the court held that a claim against an HMO was preempted by the Employee Retirement
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provided long after the patient receives treatment, it does not affect the
patient's care-so if this is a necessary element of the practice of medicine,
an expert is not practicing medicine.
This Article proposes that there is in actuality no carried out
requirement. For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that an expert
witness' investigation and analysis of a plaintiff's condition was arguably
close to a diagnosis. 2 0  Moreover, a forensic pathologist determining the
cause of a patient's death by performing an autopsy, by the nature of the
actions involved, practices medicine. 2 ' Since there is no carried out
requirement, an expert witness practices medicine because expert testimony
involves the application of medical judgment to a particular case.
2. What is the Negligent or Incompetent Practice of Medicine?
The Federation of State Medical Boards'2 22 model medical practice act
defines competence as having the "requisite abilities and qualities" to
effectively practice medicine and "adhering to professional ethical
Income Safety Act (ERISA) because an HMO's medical decisions were made in order to determine
the availability of insurance benefits.
220. Joseph v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 1991). The court
quoted Dr. Joseph's statement of his activities at length:
I reviewed medical records regarding the care and treatment of the child who had an
upper gastrointestinal bleeding condition ... . There was a 13-year old child who was
admitted to the hospital because of some type of condition which [had] produced some
upper gastrointestinal bleeding. Observation and management of the child were such that
she required an elective operative procedure. The day of the operative procedure, a flat
and upright x-ray of the abdomen was obtained which showed a large dilated stomach
filled with blood and gastric secretions. The child was brought to the operating room with
no attempt to evacuate the stomach prior to the induction of anesthesia, nor was the
anesthesiologist informed of the necessity to do a quick crash-in because of the largely
dilated stomach. At the time of induction anesthesia, the child vomited, aspirated and
expired. I testified feeling that having seen the x-ray of the child prior to the performance
of an elective operative procedure, that in my opinion it was below the standard of care to
either fail to insert a nasogastric tube to evacuate the child's stomach to reduce the
incidence of aspiration pneumonia, or to inform the anesthesiologist [of the] failure to
evacuate the stomach so that a crash-in could be performed. And that essentially was the
case.
Id.
221. A forensic pathologist investigates and evaluates cases of unexpected and suspicious deaths.
THE AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES, WHICH MEDICAL SPECIALIST FOR YOU. 21-22
(rev. ed. Apr. 2002).
222. The Federation of State Medical Boards is an organization dedicated to promoting high
standards for physicians. Its membership consists of all the state medical boards in the United
States. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, http://www.fsmb.org/.
standards., 223  Therefore, like medical malpractice, the negligent or
incompetent practice of medicine is a deviation from an accepted standard of
care. 22 4  State medical boards have authority to prospectively promulgate
standards for the practice of medicine and discipline physicians for failing to
comply with these standards. 225 The boards may also discipline a physician
for deviating from generally accepted standards of medical practice.226
3. Is Giving Improper Expert Testimony the Negligent Practice of
Medicine?
To determine whether giving improper testimony is the negligent
practice of medicine, medical boards will first have to establish a standard of
care for medical expert testimony. This article proposes basing the standard
of care on ethical guidelines addressing expert testimony published by
related professional associations. The AMA's ethical code requires experts
to "have recent and substantive experience in the area in which they
testify., 227 The American Association of Neurosurgeons (AANS) states that
an expert "shall diligently and thoroughly prepare himself or herself.,
228
The American College of Radiology (ACR) specifies that experts "be
familiar with the relevant standard of care" and that the expert's opinion be
able to withstand peer review. 229  Therefore, this Article proposes the
standard of care for expert testimony includes the following requirements:
(1) the expert must be knowledgeable about current medical practice
standards; (2) the expert's testimony must be consistent with generally
accepted medical practices; and (3) the expert's opinion must be based on
generally accepted medical standards.
Under such a standard of care, improper expert testimony could be
considered the negligent or incompetent practice of medicine. A physician
providing improper testimony would necessarily deviate from the standard
of care requiring that testimony be either consistent with generally accepted
medical practices or based on generally accepted medical standards.
223. FSMB MODEL ACT, supra note 189, at § XII(A)(I).
224. Id. at § XII(A)(2)-(3).
225. See id. at § III.
226. Id. at § XII(E). The medical practice act allows discipline of any physician found to be
"dyscompetent or incompetent." Id. at § XII. Dyscompetent is defined as "failing to maintain [the
profession's] acceptable standards." Id. at § XII(A)(2). Incompetent is defined as "lacking requisite
abilities and qualities" needed to practice medicine. Id. at § XII(A)(3).
227. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-9.07 (2004).
228. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEUROSURGEONS, CODE OF ETHICS § V(B),
http://www.aans.org/library/Article.aspx?Articleld=9917.
229. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF RADIOLOGY, ACR PRACTICE GUIDELINE ON THE EXPERT WITNESS
IN RADIOLOGY § IV(B)(2), (B)(4),
http://www.acr.org/s.acr/bin.asp?CID=0&DID= 2217&DOC=FILE.pdf.
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Therefore, a board could conclude that improper testimony is the negligent
practice of medicine.
C. What State Medical Boards Currently Have in Place and What They
Need To Modify To Effectively Regulate Improper Expert Witness
Testimony
This Article argues that state medical boards currently have authority to
discipline physicians who give improper testimony, by classifying the
improper testimony as either unprofessional conduct or the incompetent
practice of medicine. 230  Because it is uncertain whether such disciplinary
actions will be upheld in court, this Article recommends that boards
promulgate standards defining the standard of care for medical expert
testimony or defining the giving of improper testimony to be unprofessional
conduct.
This Article recommends that boards follow the lead of the Federation
of State Medical Boards (FSMB) and define the giving of false or deceptive
testimony to be unprofessional conduct.231 This Article further recommends
that boards establish standards for expert witness testimony.23 According to
the standard of care proposed by this Article, an expert's opinion must be
based on generally accepted medical science.2 33 This Article imagines that
230. The process of such proceedings can be illustrated by analogy to New York's procedure.
First, disciplinary proceedings are initiated by the filing of a complaint with the medical board. E.g.,
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6510(1)(a) (McKinney 2005). An investigation is then undertaken and if
warranted, charges are filed. Id. at § 65101(1)(b). Then an adversarial hearing is held before a panel
of the state medical board. Id. § 6510(3). The hearing results in a written report which includes
findings of fact, determination of guilt or non-guilt, and a recommended penalty. Id. at §
65101(3)(a). The board can show breach of the standard of care through expert witness testimony;
however, expert testimony is not always required because "a specialized administrative agency is
expected to use its own expertise in resolving a case." I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 3-23. If the
board deems the giving of improper testimony to be unprofessional conduct, it will have to prove
that the physician's conduct was unprofessional. The evidentiary standard would be either
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Tara K. Widmer,
South Dakota Should Follow Public Policy and Switch to the Preponderance Standard for Medical
License Revocation After In Re the Medical License of Dr. Reuben Setliff, M.D., 48 S.D. L. REV.
388, 398-99 (2003).
231. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (demonstrating that improper testimony is false and
deceptive).
232. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3 (proposing a standard of care for expert witness testimony).
233. Id.
the review of an expert's testimony would be similar to a Daubert analysis
with the board evaluating the soundness of the expert's methodology.234
V. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM DISCIPLINING PHYSICIANS FOR IMPROPER
TESTIMONY
Discipline for improper testimony raises several important questions.
First, if an expert is practicing medicine, must the expert be licensed in the
state where the testimony is provided? Second, if the profession established
a standard of care for expert testimony, will experts be subject to liability
from their testimony? Third, does discipline for expert testimony violate the
First Amendment? Fourth, if experts' testimony must be consistent with
accepted medical customs, will there be a revival of the "customary
practice" standard? Finally, if giving expert testimony falls within the
practice of medicine, what other activities might conceivably fall within the
practice of medicine?
The strongest argument against considering expert witness testimony to
be the practice of medicine is that experts would need to be licensed in the
states where they testify. This would make it more difficult for plaintiffs to
find expert witnesses. 235  However, most states have a "consultation
exception" that might allow an out-of-state physician to testify as an expert
236 th
witness. Under the consultation exception, the plaintiff would hire a local
physician who would consult with the out-of-state expert about the
plaintiffs case. 237 Another possibility is for states to issue "special purpose"
licenses to out-of-state experts, similar to the "special purpose" licenses
234. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93; see also supra note 88.
The expert's peers would be defined as specialists in the field about which the expert testified.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
http://www.aapl.org/AMA-expertwitness.htm.
235. This would work against one of the public policy reasons for abandoning the "locality rule."
Under the locality rule an expert testifies as to the customary practice in the defendant physician's
community. When the locality rule was in place, plaintiffs often had a difficult time finding local
physicians willing to testify as expert witnesses against their peers. See generally 1 FURROW, supra
note 16, at § 6-2 (discussing movement from locality rule to national standard for specialists).
236. Forty-six states have a consultation exception. Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: RXfor the
Future of Health Care, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 147, 168 (2000). However, a
discussion of the "consultation exception" is beyond the scope of this Article.
237. This approach is favored by the Federation of State Medical Boards. See FEDERATION OF
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LICENSE PORTABILITY (2002),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002-grpolLicensePortability.pdf This approach is opposed by the
American Medical Association, which criticizes it as an infringement upon the states' right to
regulate the practice of medicine within their boundaries. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PHYSICIAN LICENSURE: AN UPDATE OF TRENDS: LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE ACROSS STATE LINES (Sept. 4, 2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2378.html#. Whether states should issue "special purpose" licenses for
out-of-state physicians practicing within their borders on a short-term basis is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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issued by some states to telemedicine providers. 238  Both the consultation
exception and special purpose licenses for out-of-state experts would allow
plaintiffs to retain out-of-state physicians as experts.239
If the medical profession establishes a standard of care for medical
expert witness testimony, an expert could potentially be liable for "mal-
testimony,' 24 ° i.e., negligently testifying. However, witnesses are generally
immune to civil actions resulting from their testimony24 1 except in the rare
cases discussed supra Part III.A.4.242 Therefore, it is unlikely that expert
witnesses risk exposure to liability based on their testimony.
Discipline of a physician for improper testimony could potentially raise
a colorable First Amendment claim because testimony is a speech-related
activity. 243 However, the government may generally regulate professional
speech. 244 Regulations burdening professional speech are generally allowed
because they have only an incidental impact on speech.245  Further, the
government has an interest is preventing the expressions of professional
opinions that are inconsistent with the profession's accepted standards.246
Therefore, an expert disciplined for improper testimony is unlikely to
successfully challenge disciplinary action on First Amendment grounds.
Standards of practice prohibiting experts from criticizing generally
accepted medical customs could revive the customary practice standard.
Under the customary practice standard, the medical profession establishes
the standard of care. 47 Until recently, most jurisdictions were "customary
238. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.261 (2004); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 163.14(a) (2004).
239. Which board would have authority to regulate the out-of-state physician's testimony is
beyond the scope of this Article.
240. Michael S. Victoroff, Peer Review of the Inexpert Witness, or... Do You Trust Chickens to
Guard the Coop?, MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE, Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0209/0209.ethics.html. Granted, it is hard to conceive
that a plaintiff or defendant could be considered to be in a physician-patient relationship with the
expert witness, which is a prerequisite for a malpractice action.
241. See discussion supra Part llI.A.4.
242. E.g., Mattco Forge Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Ct. App. 1992).
243. The First Amendment protects against government limitations on freedom of speech, among
others. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion of the implications of the first amendment on
this doctrine, see Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth ": Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE L. REV. 885, 889 (2000).
244. See Kry, supra note 243, at 890.
245. Id. at 891.
246. Id. at 893.
247. In most custom-based standard of care jurisdictions, the standard is based on national
customs instead of local customs; therefore the standard of care is the care and skill ordinarily
provided by similar physicians throughout the country. I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 6-2.
practice" jurisdictions.248 However, there has been a trend towards the
adoption of the "reasonable physician" standard in most jurisdictions.2 49
Under the reasonable physician standard, the jury determines the standard of
care. 25" An expert witness in a customary practice jurisdiction plays a
different role than an expert in a reasonable physician jurisdiction. In a
customary practice jurisdiction, an expert testifies about what physicians
normally do under similar circumstances.2 5' In a reasonable physician
jurisdiction, the expert testifies about what the defendant physician should
have done under the particular circumstances at issue.252 A standard
preventing an expert from criticizing generally accepted practices could
prevent an expert from testifying about what the defendant should have done
under the circumstances.
If giving medical expert testimony is the practice of medicine, what
other activities would be considered to fall within the practice of medicine?
Would teaching be the practice of medicine? Would writing a book be the
practice of medicine? This Article proposes that giving medical expert
testimony is different from teaching and writing a book. As discussed supra
Part IV.B. 1, giving medical expert testimony is the application of medical
judgment to a particular case. Therefore, the recognition that the giving of
medical expert testimony can be regulated by state medical boards would
not necessary support an argument for permitting medical boards to regulate
teaching or writing medical textbooks.253
248. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 163 (2000).
249. Id. Jurisdictions generally point to common limitations on the custom-based standard. Some
examples of limitations include: (1) requiring expert testimony to educate the jury about customary
medical practices; (2) the "respectable minority rule" where "physicians are divided among two or
more respectable schools of thought;" (3) the movement toward abandonment of the locality rule; (4)
the "error in judgment rule" which insulates reasonable treatment decisions that lead to bad
outcomes; (5) the "best judgment" cases where physicians with unique or special information are
required to use it regardless of custom; and (6) "common knowledge" cases where plaintiffs can
recover in the absence of "expert testimony and despite evidence that the physician complied with
custom." Id. at 166-67. In jurisdictions adhering to the traditional rule, i.e., "customary-practice"
jurisdictions, physicians are held to the standard of "customary care" of the "reasonable physician"
standard. In most custom-based standard of care jurisdictions, the standard is based on national
customs instead of local customs, therefore the standard of care is the care and skill ordinarily
provided by similar physicians throughout the country. See I FURROW, supra note 16, at § 6-2
(explaining that standard of care for primary care physicians and specialists is a national standard).
250. Philip G. Peters, The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REv. 909,911
(2002).
251. Id. at 920.
252. Idat916.
253. However, it is possible that a lecture or book about a particular case could be considered to
be the practice of medicine according to the arguments made in this Article supporting the inclusion
of expert testimony within the practice of medicine. See generally discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As part of the social contract between the medical profession and the
public, the profession has an obligation to ensure that medical expert
testimony is accurate and unbiased.1 4  Therefore the profession has an
obligation to police its members acting as medical experts. Further, the state
should respect this social contract by permitting the profession to discipline
its members. However, disciplinary actions against plaintiffs' experts give
the appearance that the profession is trying to protect doctors at the expense
of plaintiffs. 255 Therefore the profession should ensure that defense expert
testimony is also subject to review.
If physicians are unable to prevent their peers from testifying
improperly in malpractice cases, the state will be forced to intervene. This
would serve only to weaken the traditional deference given professions. If
the public does indeed benefit from allowing professions to regulate
themselves, then surely the public would suffer the most from an
infringement upon the traditional privileges of professions.
309
254. E.g., Robert W. Bucholz, Creating a Workable Expert Witness Program, AAOS ONLINE
BULLETIN (June 2004), http://www.aaos.org/wordhtml/bulletin/jun04/acdnws 1.htm.
255. Victoroff, supra note 240.
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